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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Notes
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE UNDER DECLARA-
TORY JUDGMENTS ACT-Two recent decisions, Duchi v.
Duchi,1 and McCalmont v. McCalmont,2 the former grant-
ing a decree of nullity of a purporting marriage under the
recent Declaratory Judgments Acts and the latter refusing
to grant a decree under the same act, present an interest-
ing question on the subject of the annulment of marriages
in this commonwealth.
By common law principles and by statutory provisions
many purporting marriages in this commonwealth are void
or voidable. Thus, since the essentials to all contracts,
capacity and consent, must be present to constitute a valid
marriage,4 a marriage entered into by a person when in-
sane is absolutely void, 5 and if the appearance of consent
was based on mistake as to the legal effect of the cere-
mony, as where one party acts in jest," or on a mistake as
to the identity of the person,7 the purporting marriage is
likewise void. Bigamous marriages,8 marriage of divorced
person with paramour,9 and incestuous marriages in cases
of persons related in a direct lineal line, or of brother
and sister1 ° are likewise absolutely void.
Other marriages forbidden by reason of consanguinity n1
111 Pa. D. & C. 610 (1928).
293 Pa. Super. 203 (1928).
3June 18, 1923, P. L. 840.41n re Stevenson, 272 Pa. 291; Torrence's Est., 47 Pa. Super. 509;
Wandall's Est., 29 Pa. Dist: 1132.
5In re Newlin, 231 Pa. 312; may be declared so even after death
of either or both parties, Bell v. Bennett, 73 Ga. 784; Hagenson v.
Hagenson, 258 Ill. 197, 101 N. E. 606.
OBarclay v. Com., 116 Ky. 275, 76 SW 4; Blumenthal v. Blumen-
thal, 31 N. J. Eq. 194; McClurg v. Terry, 21 N. J. Eq. 225; Barnes v.
Wyethe, 28 Vt. 41.
7Delpit v. Young, 51 La. Ann. 923, 25 S. 547; Meyer v. Meyer,
7 Oh. Dec. (Reprint) 627; 2 Kent Comm. p. 77.
"Klass v. Klass, 14 Pa. Super. 550.
9Adams v. Adams, 2 Chest. Co. 560; Stull's Est. 183 Pa. 625.
'
0 Sutton v. Warren, 10 Metc. (Mass.) 451, 452; Wightman v.
Wightman, 4 Johns Ch. (NY.) 343.
"Act of Mar, 13, 1815, sec, 5, P. L. 150; Act of June 24, 1901,
P. L. 597,
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or affinity 12 are merely voidable. 18 Likewise impotency, 1
fraud or duress, 15 intoxication 0 and non-age' existing at
the time of the marriage, make the purporting marriage
voidable.
But only in the case of a bigamous marriage have
our statutes provided for an annulment 18 and even in that
case it is provided that the procedure shall be the same as
in cases of divorce. The Act of 1815 declares marriages
within certain degrees of consanguinity and affinity "void
to all intents and purposes."' 19 They are in fact only void-
able 20 and the said act makes no reference to the annul-
ment of such void (voidable) incestuous marriages, but
provides that "It shall and may be lawful for the courts
of common pleas to grant divorces from the bonds of mat-
rimony in such cases." However such a divorce has the
effect of an annulment1.2  Our statutes also provide for the
granting of divorce for impotency 22 existing, or for fraud
or duress 2 practiced, at the time of the marriage. Such
divorces also have the effect of annulments.
In summary we note, that Pennsylvania has a divorce
procedure, with the effect of an annulment, for bigamous
and incestuous marriages, and for marriages voidable for
impotency existing at, and for fraud or duress practiced
at, the inception of the marriage. But there is no proce-
dure whatsoever to annul purporting marriages on the
12See acts in preceding note.
'sWalter's App., 70 Pa. 392; Parker's App., 44 Pa. 309; Schofield
v. Schofield, 51 Pa. Super. 564.
"4A. C. v. B. C., 11 Wkly. N. C. (Pa.) 479; A. C. v. B. C., 10 Wkly.
N. C. 569; and cases cited 38 C. J. p. 1288, sec. 18.
'
8 Barnett v. Kimmell, 35 Pa. 13, (fraud); Richards v. Richards,
19 Pa. Co. 322, (duress).
IOPrine v. Prine, 36 Fla. 676, 18 S 781, 34 LRA 87.
'
7See generally Tiffany, Dom. Rel. p. 21 and 22 LRA. NS. 1202;
Marriage within the age of consent seems to be neither strictly ,void
nor strictly voidable, but rather inchoate and imperfect. 2 Kent.
Com. 78, 79; 1 Bishop, secs. 143-153; 1 BI. Com. 436.
'
8Act of Apr. 14, 1859, P. L. 647, amend. Mar. 29, 1927, P. L. 71.
'
9Act of Mar. 13, 1815, P. L. 150, sec. 5.
soParker's App., 44 Pa. 309; Walter's App., 70 Pa. 392.
2 tFaust v. Faust, 25 Pa. Dist. 952; McClain v. McClain, 40 Pa.
Super. 248.
22Act of Mar. 13, 1815, P. L. 150, see. 1., reenacted and amended,
June 28, 1923, P. L. 886.
28Act of May 8, 1854, P. L. 644.
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ground of insanity,24 intoxication, mistake, jest, non-age,2 5
or other legal incapacity.26 However, the nullity of a void
marriage may be shown in any legal proceeding where it
is a pertinent matter.2 7
Thus if a marriage is absolutely void or voidable, no
sentence of avoidance is absolutely necessary'B - "yet, as
well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace
of mind of all persons concerned, it is expedient that the
nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared
by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction. '29
Many states have statutes giving jurisdiction in suits
for nullity of marriage, and it is held almost universally in
this country that a suit to annul an invalid marriage will
lie, independently of any statutory authority therefor. Such
suits are held to be within the ordinary jurisdiction of the
courts of equity.30  But in this Commonwealth it has been
held that the courts do not have such jurisdiction independ-
ent of statute.3 1 Thus many invalid or voidable marriages
can only be attacked collaterally, and at a time when so
questioned, witnesses and parties may be dead or unavail-
24The Act of Apr. 13, 1843, P. L. 233, sec. 8, amend. Apr. 18, 1905,
P. L. 211, does not make insanity a ground for divorce. Baughman v.
Baughman, 34 Pa. Super. 271. The act with its amendment relates to
procedure only, and does not declare a new cause of action. Divorces
erroneously entered under this act were validated by the Acts of
May 3, 1909, P. L. 390, sec. 1, and May 13, 1927, P. L. 991, sec. 1.
2 5Seibert v. Seibert, 3 Pa. D. & C. 142.26As spouse divorced for adultery is forbidden to marry the para-
mour during life time of spouse by first marriage. Act of Mar. 13,
1815, 6 Sm. L. 286, 289, sec. 9.; and cases cited in note 9, supra.
27Heffner v. Heffner, 23 Pa. 104; Thomas v. Thomas, 124 Pa.
646; Wayne Twp. v. Porter Twp., 138 Pa. 181; Clark's Fst., 173 Pa.
451; Divver's Est., 22 Pa. Super. 436.28But the act of Mar. 27, 1903, P. L. 102, makes it a misdemeanor-
"if any person who has entered into a contract of marriage with an-
other person, whether the marriage be valid in law or not, shall,
while the other contracting party be alive, and before said marriage
has been declared void or annulled by the decree of a proper court
of record, go through any form of marriage recognized as binding
under the laws of this commonwealth with any other person,-and-
where the first marriage shall be valid in law, the second and all
subsequent marriages shall be bigamous and void".
292 Kent. Com. 76.
8
°See Tiffany, Dom. Rel., p. 60, and cases there cited.
8BPitcairn v. Pitcairn, 201 Pa, 368.
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able, and during the interim property and civil rights of
the parties remain uncertain and unfixed. The merits of
having the status of the parties determined judicially in a
direct proceeding cannot be questioned, but prior to 1923,
no such procedure was available in this Commonwealth.
Does the Declaratory Judgements Act give the needed re-
medy?
The reason for the general acceptance and widespread
adoption"2 of this procedural reform is largely attributed
to its intrinsic merits in effecting the removal of clouds
from legal relations and in simplifying the adjudication of
contested issues, and in preventing, rather than merely cur-
ing, legal injury."3
"The purpose" of the act "is to settle and to afford
from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights,
status and other legal relations, and is to be liberally con-
strued and administered. 3 4 Certainly its purpose would
justify its use in declaring invalid marriages, void.
It confers jurisdiction to determine and declare "rights,
status and other legal relations" which are affected by, or
as to which a question arises under a statute, contract,
etc. 3 5  A question as to the validity of a marriage is one
which concerns the "status" of the man and woman under
the marriage "contract," and in most instances is also a
question "arising under a statute." Therefore a declara-
tion of annulment of a marriage would appear to come
directly within the enumerated powers of Section 2. More
than that, Section 5, specifically provides that the enumer-
ated powers do not limit and restrict the general powers in
any proceeding where declaratory relief is sought, in which
a judgment or decree will terminate the controversy or
remove an uncertainty. Who would deny that such a de-
cree would not remove much uncertainty in all cases of in-
valid or voidable marriages?
In the case of Duchi v. Duchi, supra, a decree was
granted under the Declaratory Judgments Act, annuling a
marriage between first cousins.
32For comment on Declaratory Judgments consult list of articles
cited in 34 Har. L. R. 697; for list of states passing the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act see footnote p. 466 of Kariher's Petition,
284 Pa. 455, where cases upholding its constitutionality are also cited.
33Borchard in 34 Har. L. R. 697.
84Sec. 12, "Construction", Declaratory Judgments Act, supra.
"
5Sections 1 and 2, Declaratory Judgments Act, supra.
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In the case of McCalviont v. McCalnont, supra, the
petitioner was the paramour of a woman divorced for adul-
tery in Pennsylvania. He married the said woman in
Maryland during the life time of her former husband.
Both were residents of Pennsylvania and the Act of Mar.
13, 1815, 6 Sm. L. 286, sec. 9, forbade such marriage. The
court refused the petition for a declaratory judgment on
two grounds: First, that the act should not be resorted
to where, as here, a method has already been established
for the speedy determination of the issues involved, citing
List's Est., 284 Pa. 255; Second, that it is a matter of judi-
cial discretion whether or not jurisdiction will be taken of
any particular case.
Its second reason is sustainable, 36 but the first is not
as no other remedy of any kind is available to annul a
marriage on the facts of the instant case.37 In List's Est.,
supra, a decree was asserted to be unwarranted by reason
that an equally speedy determination of the question could
be had under a proceeding already pending'8  The case'of
McCalnmont v. McCalmont, supra, being sustainable on the
ground that the court could by the exercise of judicial dis-
cretion refuse to render a declaratory judgment - cannot
be cited as an authority that a marriage will not be de-
clared invalid under the act in a proper case.
Since other jurisdictions provide adequate procedure
for annulment, cases of invalid marriages are not so likely
to arise in other jurisdictions under the Declaratory Judg-
ments Act, and no cases have as yet been digested. But
several cases in England, where the act has been in exist-
ence since 1852, have made declarations of the status of
parties under purporting marriages.8 9
Our supreme court has said that the act can be made of
real use 40 and if a case involving the annulment of a mar-
riage is brought before it under the Declaratory Judgments
Act, may it act accordingly.
HORACE G. PORTS.
"
6Kariher's Petition, supra.; Sec. 6. of the act, supra.
37Note 25, supra.
38 Accord, Dempsey's Est., 288 Pa. 459.
39In re Phillips (1919), 1 Ch. 128, 88 L. J. Ch. N. S. 27, 120 L. T.
N. S. 213, 35 Times L. R. 98, 63 Sol. Jo. 116; Despatie v. Tremblay
(1921), 1 A. C. (Eng.) 702, 124 L. T. N. S. 674 (1921) W. N. 67, 27
Times L. R. 395, 90 L. J. P. C. N. S, 121,
'°Kariher's Petition, supra.
